| Abstract: Discrimination as a behavioral procedure/process and the discriminative stimulus (SD) as a technical term, have proven to be useful constructs in the investigative and applied domains of behavior analysis. However, despite their utility, two limitations are encountered: 1) how the construct is defined varies across the literature, showing some conceptual disagreements, and 2) current definitions focus on the applied and investigative domains but do not provide an account more suitable for the interpretative domain, in which the interrelation of integrated fields of stimulus objects/events with behavior is considered. To address the first issue, a historical review of the constructs of “discrimination” and the “SD” was conducted. The presence of a general lack of consensus on how they are defined and a procedural focus suitable for the investigative/applied domains is concluded. For the second, an interpretative account of discrimination/SD in which 1) a clear distinction between stimulus objects/events as something separated from their functions, 2) a separation between process, as the historical circumstances under which stimulus functions are acquired, and outcome, as stimulus functions in the present and 3) discrimination as the interrelation of behavior with a field of objects/events and not discrete stimuli, is proposed. |