| Abstract: Recent developments in relational frame theory suggest that at least part of the enterprise is gravitating toward constructing an interbehavioral framework better suited to deal with the complex dynamics of language and cognition. While such a pathway is likely beneficial for the enterprise as a whole, this direction does not parallel those currently taking place in interbehavioral psychology. For a long time, it was thought that experimentation simply constitutes a particular form of manipulative activity within the investigative domain where causal constructs could be used in a restricted sense. However, significant disconnect between investigative and interpretive constructs within interbehavioral psychology warrants reconsideration of what integrated fields describe to account for molar organization of behavior observed in experimental situations. The purpose of this presentation is to make the case for why reformulating the integrated field construct so that it can account for interrelated, interacting patterns is essential for forward progress in relational frame theory, and the investigative domain of interbehavioral psychology more generally. To this end, a more molar interbehavioral framework—orientationalism—will be applied to understanding a current investigative focus of the relational frame theory: implicit relational assessment procedures. Advantages and future directions of doing so will be discussed. |
| Abstract: In earlier lectures and a published paper in Behavior and Philosophy I argued that even though most of Noam Chomsky’s criticisms in his infamous review from 1959 have been adequately answered by behaviorists (MacCorquodale, Palmer and others), still his most basic criticism is overlooked. We see that when Chomsky comments further on the debate (in his review of Beyond Freedom and Dignity and later), he just reiterates this basic point, the questionable extrapolation from simple rat behavior to human verbal behavior. I this lecture I provide a definite answer to this final point of Chomsky’s, by analyzing Skinner’s final position regarding the term operant. I argue, in effect, that Skinner’s operant theory is not based on his research tradition with rats in Skinner boxes (Skinner could not have come up with the term operant within this research tradition), but is rather based on a second, different and neglected research tradition, namely Skinner’s very early (1933) research on humans (the verbal summator experiments). Given this final and surprising answer, then not only has Chomsky been finally and fully answered, but also the typical textbook criticism regarding Skinner’s behaviorism has to be amended. |