Association for Behavior Analysis International

When one sees a cup in the presence of a cup, one cannot know if one sees the cup as another person does; we only hear a person saying "cup." As Skinner (1963) maintained, this "seeing" is a part of the contingency that accompanies saying "cup" in the presence of a cup, what he described as the "behavior of seeing." We will argue that a similar seeing occurs when the cup is not there, with the difference being what variables occasion that seeing. There is no need to assume there is a private image of a cup that is seen. We will provide demonstrations that illustrate this position. Further, we see more than what is presented; not only do we see the cup, but also the table upon which it is sitting and the room it is in. We will describe what may account for this, drawing on both the experience of those who are born sightless, but who regain their sight, and child development research. We shall show how distinctions in dimensional stimulus control and instructional stimulus control, as articulated by Israel Goldiamond, and certain potentiating variables can account for private seeing without the need to postulate private stimuli as privately seen.

When one hears "cup" in the presence of someone saying "cup," one cannot know if one hears "cup" as another person does; the only thing known is that each person says "cup" when asked what was heard. As Skinner (1963) maintained, hearing is a part of the contingency that accompanies saying "cup" in the presence of a cup. We experience what may be described as the "behavior of hearing." We will argue that a similar "hearing" occurs when the word "cup" is not present, with the difference being what occasions that hearing. There is no need to assume "cup" is privately spoken and heard by a private, inner ear. We will provide demonstrations that illustrate our position. We shall show how distinctions in dimensional and instructional stimulus control, as articulated by Israel Goldiamond, and certain potentiating variables can account for private hearing without the need to postulate a private stimulus, which is then heard.

We will describe how the presence of seeing and hearing, whether public or private, is not required for human verbal behavior. Estimates suggest that up to 50% of people do not engage in private monologue. Helen Keller lived in a unique world of only vibration and tactile stimulation, yet she was conversant in five languages and wrote twelve insightful and influential books. When reading “dog” in braille, she did not privately hear the word dog or see a dog privately; rather, dog was a distinct set of tactile stimulus-response relations. This was also true when d-o-g was spelled on her hand. We argue that the features of a living dog, when tactilely encountered, overlapped enough with those encountered when seeing a dog to make shared abstractional and instructional stimulus control possible. Her remarkable story has implications for understanding and misunderstanding the role of private experience in sighted and hearing people.