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| Science and Human Values |
| Sunday, May 30, 2004 |
| 3:00 PM–4:20 PM |
| Independence East |
| Area: TPC/CSE; Domain: Applied Research |
| Chair: Maria R. Ruiz (Rollins College) |
| Abstract: Learning Objectives
The BC(A)BA will correctly identify the radical behaviorist perspective on survival as a criterion by which to assess the value of a given cultural practice.
The BC(A)BA will describe two arguments to defend the claim that "Radical Behaviorism cannot (and should not) be called upon to resolve value conflicts".
The BC(A)BA will correctly articulate Skinner's objection to the traditional value-fact distinction in scientific perspectives. |
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| Values and their Implications for Practice |
| JONATHAN J. TARBOX (University of Nevada, Reno), Linda J. Parrott Hayes (University of Nevada, Reno) |
| Abstract: We discuss ethical situations as circumstances in which more than one course of action appears possible, and upon having compared the anticipated consequencesof these actions with respect to cultural standards of right and wrong, a person takes the course having relatively more rightful consequences. This interpretation of ethical conduct draws into consideration the values inherent in such standards. We argue that Skinner's notion of survival as a value is nota workable criterion upon which to judge the rightfulness or wrongfulness of cultural practices in that it cannot be applied to such events in a predictive sense. We offer a process alternative to this notion. |
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| Do Personal Values Have a Role in Behavior Analytic Practices? |
| MARIA R. RUIZ (Rollins College), Bryan T. Roche (National University of Ireland, Maynooth) |
| Abstract: Skinner's discussions about human values were largely embedded in his analysis of cultural design (e.g., 1971). Accordingly, Skinner focused on the survival of a culture as a criterion according to which given cultural practices may be evaluated. Thus, Skinner's criterion for the assessment of cultural practices was pragmatic. To this extent, no a priori or extant set of values could be applied to human practices, nor could the personal values of an individual be trusted to ensure cultural survival. However, recent developments in the analysis of verbal behavior suggest that human's may be capable of establishing personal goals, and responding to verbally constructed values, that serve purposes other than survival. In particular, a contextualistic perspective suggests that the goals of any cultural activity can only be assessed in terms of personal values which themselves may remain private and are ultimately indefensible. The present paper considers the relative merits of the radical behavioral and contextualistic views in terms of the scope they offer in applying the experimental analysis of behavior to improving the welfare of the world's citizens. |
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| On Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics, and Behaviorism |
| MECCA CHIESA (University of Kent) |
| Abstract: A behavioral account of ethics crosses at least two boundaries typically drawn by philosophers. It conforms to a meta-ethic known as ethical naturalism, in which ethical sentences are translated into non-ethical ones, and to a meta-ethic known as relativism which holds that there are no universal principles of morality. Several authors have raised a potential criticism of behaviorism’s position on ethics. The criticism is that behaviorism cannot suggest rules for establishing principles of proper conduct. This presentation argues that behaviorism cannot (and should not) be called upon to establish rules for moral conduct or for the resolution of value conflicts. |
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| The Variables of Which Values are a Function |
| SAM LEIGLAND (Gonzaga University) |
| Abstract: The ordinary-language concept of values has a complex history in psychology and in science generally. The traditional fact-value distinction commonly found in traditional scientific perspectives has been challenged by the varieties of philosophical pragmatism, which have similarities to Skinner's radical behaviorism. Skinner's challenge to the fact-value distinction maintained that the important behavioral phenomena of 'values' call for a scientific analysis, or in other words, that we need more facts about values. This paper summarizes some of the processes and variables relevant to an analysis of values as behavioral phenomena. A brief examination of relevant nonverbal contingencies of reinforcement will be followed by a discussion of the important role of verbal contingencies in the acquisition, maintenance, and dynamics of the behavioral phenomena of values. Some issues of empirical methodology will be discussed. If the complex issues of methodology can be addressed successfully, then behavior analysis will be in the position to move beyond descriptive studies of values, such as those found in phenomenological psychology, by providing analyses of the variables of which values are a function. |
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